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CONJECTURES AND RATIONAL PREFERENCES
ROBERT J. LEVY WITTENBERG UNIVERSITY ABSTRACT. I survey the difficulties of several probabilistic views of non-deductive argument and of inductive probability and propose to explicate non-deductive reasoning in terms of rational preference.
Following a critical examination of Popper's allegedly deductive theory of rational preference, I draw upon the work of Popper and Rescher to present my view which includes: (i) the conjecturing of a set of alternative answers to or theories or hypotheses about the questions prompting the inquiry and (ii) the "reduction" of this set via plausibilistic principles of rational preference.
The view of non-deductive reasoning presented in this paper construes non-deductive (or inductive) reasoning very broadly.
Non-deductive reasoning includes all those forms of non-demonstrative reasoning in which the premises are intended to provide good grounds or reasons for the conclusion while not necessitating the conclusion. Some of the common inferences included as non-deductive are: (i) reasoning from a report of an event to an hypothesis or theory as to the cause (or perpetrator) of the event; (ii) reasoning from a report of observations to a theory accounting for those observations; (iii) reasoning from a report of a sample of a population to an hypothesis about the character of that popUlation; and (iv) reasoning from a report of a sample of a population to the character of another sample of that population.
Deductive reasoning does not differ from non-deductive or inductive reasoning in that the former reasons from the general to the specific and the latter reasons in the reverse direction. Non-deductive inferences from the observation report that 100 emeralds are green to the claim that the next emerald (or the next 100 emeralds) will also be green do not fit the pattern of reasoning from specific to general.
While few philosophers or logicians cling to the above view of non-deductive inference, many describe non-deductive or inductive inferences wholly in terms of probability. That is, the distinction is commonly drawn between (i) deductive inferences in which the conclusion is intended to be necessitated by the premises and (ii) non-deductive or inductive inferences in which the conclusion is intended to be probabil-ized by the premises. A more sophisticated variant of this probabilized approach to non-deductive inference is offered by K. Lehrer:
"An inductive argument from evidence to hypothesis is inductively cogent if and only if the hypothesis is that hypothesis which, of all the competing hypotheses, has the greatest probability of being true on the basis of the evidence. Thus, whether it is reasonable to accept an hypothesis as true if the statements of evidence are true is determined by whether that hypotheses is the most probable on the evidence of those with which it competes."l Lehrer's view of a cogent inductive argument was developed because of the recognition of the inadequacy of those views of inductive inference which hold that a cogent or strong inductive argument is one in which the premises make the conclusion probable to some high degree.
Kyburg's Lottery Paradox suggests the inadequacy of such views of inductive cogency. Suppose there is a fair lottery containing N (N > 100) tickets numbered consecutively from 1 to N. Consider ticket number K.
The probability on the evidence that it will be drawn is liN. Hence the probability that some other ticket will be drawn is (N-l)/N. If this is a high enough probability for cogent inductive inference, we may cogently infer that some ticket other than number K will be drawn. Thus, for each ticket we could cogently infer that some other ticket will be drawn.
The set of these conclusions tells us, for each ticket, that some other will be drawn. But the conditions of the lottery require that exactly one ticket will be drawn.
A related criticism applies to Lehrer's view.
Consider a case in which each ticket holder in a fair lottery compares his or her chances of winning and losing and, following the notion of inductive cogency as greater (or greatest) comparative probability, each cogently concludes that his or her ticket is not a winning ticket. The set of these conclusions is inconsistent with the evidence which includes the statements that exactly one winner will be drawn from the pool of tickets purchased.
Lehrer's view of inductive cogency needs a requirement that the set of competing hypotheses not be too narrow.
He presents this only as a goal or ideal:
We must make use of all intellectual resources at our command.
The failure to consider some competitor for a hypothesis may lead us to accept some hypothesis it is quite unreasonable to accept.
However, if we diligently searched for competitors and seriously considered the probability of each, then we may, tentatively, consider an argument inductively cogent when the conclusion is the most probable of all the competitors we can conceive. 2 This view entails that diligent but unimaginative inquirers may reason in an inductively cogent manner to a conclusion or hypothesis that is at once reasonable to accept as true on grounds of comparative probability on the evidence among its considered competitors and also unreasonable to accept (and even perhaps paradoxical to accept) on grounds of comparative probability within some broader set(s) of competitors which should have been considered.
A further problem arises for all attempts to understand non-deductive or inductive reasoning probabilistically, viz., the problem of the notion of probability. Current literature contains important distinctions between probabilities of events usually understood in terms of one or another relative frequency conception and probabilities of statements relative to other statements. The latter notion of probability is commonly termed "inductive" probability and has been explicated or explained boih in terms of relative frequencies and in quite different terms.
The key notion in the frequentist explication of inductive probability is given in the following contrast between valid deductive arguments and cogent inductive arguments: in a valid deductive argument, if all premises are true, the conclusion is always true; in a cogent inductive (or non-deductive) argument, if all premises are true, the conclusion is usually (or for the most part) true. 3 Moreover, the frequentist adds, the inductive strength of the argument varies directly with the proportion of cases in which true premises are associated with true conclusions.
This notion of inductive cogency is based on a misleading notion of deductive validity.
A valid deductive argument is not a deductive argument in which true conclusions are associated with all true premises in every case, but a deductive argument in which, if all premises are true, it is necessary that the conclusion be true as well. The frequentist fails to grasp or to deal with the modal character of deductive validity and offers a non-modal or indicative construal of deductive validity, inductive cogency, and inductive strength.
The indicative construal of deductive validity is objectionable. The indicative construal of inductive cogency and inductive strength is also objectionable, for it suggests a concern with the number of times an inductive or non-deductive argument is or will actually be used. It seems quite clear that the inductive cogency and the inductive strength of an argument do not depend in any way upon the number of times it is or will be actually used.
A leading exponent of a very different theory of inductive probability, Rudolf Carnap, sharply distinguishes between statistical and inductive probability. The statistical concept of probability Car nap identifies with the concept of relative frequency, i.e., actual relative frequency or potential relative frequency of a type of event relative to a reference class of events.
Carnap describes inductive probability as the probability "ascribed to a hypothesis with respect to a body of evidence. "4 Inductive probability measures the strength of support given to hypothesis h by evidence e or, in other words, "the degree of confirmation of h on the basis of e. "5 Car nap offers two different reasons for sharply distinguishing inductive probability from statistical probability. First, inductive probabilities are applicable in cases where relative frequencies are not or would not be known. For example, a juror in a trial must decide which of two conflicting witnesses is telling the truth. The juror does not decide whether it is more likely or more plausible that witness A lied rather than B on the basis of relative frequency within some unspecified reference group, but upon considerations of "the evidence that was presented in the trial plus any psychological knowledge of a general nature that he may possess. "6 Second, "while a statement of statistical probability asserts a matter of fact, a statement of inductive probability is of a purely logical nature. If hypothesis and evidence are given, the [inductive] probability can be determined by logical analysis and mathematical calculation. "7 The claim that inductive probability statements are of a purely logical nature distinguishes Carnap's logical theory of inductive probability from a group of theories of inductive probability yet to be eonsidered as well as from any frequency theory of inductive probability.
Carnap's logical theory of inductive probability may be illustrated by a simple example.
Suppose that we consider a very small model of the world and the language L required to describe this model, e.g., four individuals a, b, c, and d and two properties black (B) and white (W) which are taken to be mutually exclusive. Given this small model, there are sixteen possible individual distributions (represented here as con-
These individual distributions may be collected into statistical distributions stating only the number of black and white individuals, i.e., zero, one, two, three, or four black (and correspondingly four, three, two, one, and zero white).
Accepting the principle of indifference as an epistemological principle stating that "if the evidence does not contain anything that would favor either of two or more possible events, ••• they have equal probabilities relative to the evidence,"8 Car nap outlines two methods of assigning initial probabilities. Since the initial probability of a hypothesis is its probability before any factual knowledge is available, Car nap's acceptance of the principle of indifference leads to his assigning equal initial probabilities to members of the sets of hypotheses under consideration.
He has two distinct sets of hypotheses under consideration: (i) the set of hypotheses concerning the sixteen individual distributions and (ii) the set of hypotheses concerning the five statistical distributions.
Assigning equal initial probabilities to each of the hypothesis concerning the individual distributions yields Carnap's Method I, a method he subsequently rejects for epistemological reasons.
Carnap's Method II assigns equal initial probabilities first to each of the five statistical distributions and then an equal portion of that initial probability to each individual distribution within the statistical distribution.
The initial probability assignments determine the relative probabilities for any hypothesis with respect to any evidence. The connection is given via the axioms and theorems of the probability calculus, in particular the reduction formula: black (white) individuals, each of these has an isomorphism measure equal to 4. Finally, because there are six individual descriptions stating that there are exactly two white and two black individuals, each of these descriptions has an isomorphism measure equal to 6. The total of these isomorphism measures is equal to 70. Using 70 as a base, we then assign initial probabilities in the following manner in accord with the principle of indifference, viz., the initial probability of an individual distribution 0 equals the isomorphism measure of 0 divided by the total isomorphism measure TIM.
In symbols, p(D) = I (D)/TIM. Thus, e.g., p(Ba Bb Bc Bd) = 1/70, p(Ba Bb Wc Wd)= 6/70 and p(Ba Bb Bc Wd) = 4/70. This yields inverse inductive logic which expresses the gambler's fallacy that an event is more likely to occur in the future the less often it has occurred in the past.
Carnap rejects both inverse inductive logic and his own Method I because he holds that any reasonable inductive method must be consistent with his principle of learning from experience: "other things being equal, a future event is to be regarded as the more probable, the greater the relative frequency of similar events observed so far under similar circumstances. "10 Inverse inductive logic inverts this principle; and on Car nap's method I, p(Bd, Ba &. Bb &. Bc) = p(Bd) = 1/2 so that individual d's being black is more probable given the evidence that individuals a, b, and c have been black than individual d's being black given no evidence.
It is possible to construct at least one other set of initial probabilities which is consistent with both Carnap's principle of indifference and his principle of learning from experience. Each statistical distribution in our example may be characterized by the maximum number of individuals of a given color in each of its individual distributions. Let us call this number the uniformity measure of the statistical distribution. Using the symbol "UM" to indicate the uniformity measure, we have:
The total of these uniformity measures, TUM, equals 16. We then assign the initial probability of each statistical distribution SD as follows:
Next, we assign the initial probability of each individual distribution ID as an equal share of the initial probability of the statistical distribution which contains it, i.e.,
where N is the number of individual distributions within the statistical distribution containing ID.
For our example, the results may be stated as follows: p(each uniform individual distribution, i.e., 4W or 4B) = 1/4; p(each individual distribution having 3W and IB or 3B and lW)= 3/64; p(each individual distribution having 2W and 2B) = 1/48.
Because on this set of initial probabilities isomorphic individual distributions are assigned equal initial probabilities, this set is consistent with Carnap" s principle of indifference.
Because on this set of initial probabilities
of initial probabilities is consistent with his principle of learning from experience.
Because of the non-uniqueness and the apparent arbitrariness in the assignment of initial probabilities and because of the doubtful logical or analytic status of Carnap's principles of indifference and of learning from experience, it is impossible to accept Carnap's notion that statements of inductive probability which expresses the degree of confirmation of an hypothesis on the basis of evidence are purely logical or analytic. l l
Recognition of an element of arbitrariness in assigning prior probabilities is characteristic of personalistic or subjectivistic interpretations of probability offered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and Jeffrey. Although some of their statements suggest that probabilities concern an individual's actual degree of belief, what is under consideration is not the actual beliefs of this or that particular individual but the coherent beliefs of a construct, viz., a rational individual. These authors link an individual's degree of belief to his or her betting behavior. For example, an individual's preference to bet on the truth of proposition A over the truth of proposition B for the same stake is taken, on this view, to indicate a greater degree of belief by that individual in the truth of A than in the truth of B. The link between an individual's degree of belief and his or her betting behavior is then extended to take in a requirement of rationality, viz., probabilistic consistency or coherence. It is held that it would be inconsistent and irrational for an an individual to make ,-or accept a set of bets he or she cannot win because the set of bets is inconsistent with the probability calculus.
Moreover, on this view, an individual's set of degrees of belief is understood as probabilistically consistent or coherent if and only if they are consistent with the probability calculus. This expresses the (Dutch) Book Theorem.
A requirement of coherence of degrees of belief does not specify which beliefs are assigned which degrees of belief. Requiring coherence allows considerable variation in assignments of degrees of belief between individuals at the same time as well as within an individual between different times.
Defenders of this theory of inductive probability hold that the variation in assignments of degrees of belief between individuals at a given time does not prevent these individuals from coming to agreement on probabilities under certain conditions. If one understands an individual's set of degrees of belief as a set of prior or initial probabilities and inserts these prior probabilities into one or more formulas referred to as Bayes' Theorem, it soon appears that these initial probability val-ues are less important mathematically than the posterior (empirical) probabilities given in observed relative frequencies.
Because the subjective element is thus less important, two individuals with quite different sets of initial probabilities may come to an eventual agreement, on, e.g., the probability that a given urn contains forty percent green tokens or marbles.
This appeal to eventual agreement fails to show that the prior probability assignment is of no great importance, for "at any given stage of inquiry, there is only a finite amount of evidence, which may not be sufficient to bring different investigators into close agreement."12 Difficulties also attend the problem of the possibility of wayward change in a given individual's sets of degrees of belief from time to time. Given only a requirement of coherence, an individual might well shift from one coherent set to another coherent set for no reason at all or for physical causes such as being bumped on the head or fatigue. Both Car nap and Jeffrey have proposed formulas expressing requirements for rational change of belief, but these clearly go beyond the original subjectivist requirement of coherence and suggest a more normative and interpersonal or intersubjective theory.
Rather than dwell upon further criticisms of the subjective theory of indicative probability, I want to bring out an important feature of the work of several subjectivists which is also found in Burks' pragmatic theory of inductive probability, viz., the analysis of inductive probability in terms of rational preference.
Jeffrey states that his purpose in The Logic of Decision is the "elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility which form the core of Bayesian decision theory." This elucidation is in terms of a "theory of preference between propositions, within which a Bayesian agent's probability and utility functions are determined by features of his preference ranking."13 Similarly, Burks comments that Savage, in The Foundations of Statistics, "started with a set of choice situations and stipulated that the choices be made according to certain rules such as the simple ordering of preferences. He then showed that choices made this way both maximize utility and satisfy the calculus of probability.
In effect, he replaced the calculus of inductive probability, the definition of utility, and the single bare rule "maximize utility" by a rich set of rules concerning how choices should be made." 14 Burks himself bases his pragmatic theory of inductive probability on an axiomatically formulated calculus of choice which is a modification and extension of the system developed by Savage. Burks departs from personalistic or subjective theories of inductive probability by (i) including in his calculus the rules of standard inductive logic (an inductive logic consistent with Carnap's principle of learning from experience) and (ii) explicitly disallowing, as a consequence, the extreme variability of initial probability assignments characteristic of the subjective or personalistic theory.
These philosophers, while working within the tradition that views inductive or non-deductive reasoning as essentially probabilistic in na-ture, have shown that it is possible to take as a fundamental concept and structure for the elucidation of the notion of non-deductive inference not a concept of probability and an associated calculus of probability, but a notion of rational choice or preference and an associated calculus of choice or preference. While by no means suggesting that this is the purpose of any of these philosophers, I want to suggest that this interpretation of their work may be both liberating and insightful.
One of the most promising aspects of this interpretation is that there are forms of rational preference not associated with probabilities, measurable utilities, or coherent betting schemes.
To view non-deductive reasoning in the broader context of rational preference is to move away from a fixation on probabilistic puzzles such as the Lottery Paradox and to move toward both traditional and recent attempts to understand theory or hypothesis choice as well as attempts to understand non-ded uctive inference non-probabilistically.
The view of non-deductive reasoning which I propose includes both the construction of a set of competing mutually exclusive alternative hypotheses, theories, or answers and the elimination of some of these competitors via rules of rational preference.
The view proposed here resembles Popper's critical method of proposing theories and severely testing them.
A brief examination of Popper's view will allow me to distinguish my view from Popper's.
Popper reformulates Hume's logical problem of induction in at least the following three ways: (1) "L1 Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true be justified by . . . assuming the truth of certain test. . . or observation statements (which . . . are 'based on experience')?"; (2) "L2 Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true or that it is false be justified by . . . the assumption of the truth of test statements • . . ?"; and (3) "L3 Can a preference with respect to truth or falsity, for some competing universal theories over others ever be justified by such 'empirical reasons'?"15 Following Hume, Popper denies that any finite number of true test statements based on observation can justify the claim that a universal explanatory theory is true.
He asserts, without fully explaining, that such a set of test statements can justify the claim that a universal explanatory theory is true or the claim that such a theory is false. He also contends, but fails to show, that such a set of test statements can justify a preference for some competing universal theories over others. Maintaining that his formulations of and solutions to L1, L2, and L3 "fall entirely within the scope of deductive logic" ,16 he explains that, if we are fortunate, "it may happen that our test statements may refute some--but not all--of the competing theories; and since we are searching for a true theory, we shall prefer those whose falsity has not been established. " 17 Popper describes his method as a method of elimination and explicitly denies that his method can establish the truth of any theory. 18 Popper states that his negative answer to L1 means that "we must regard all laws or theories as hypothetical or conjectural; that is, as guesses." 19 Even if a theory or law has survived a series of very severe attempts to falsify it and has met strong requirements concerning its empirical content and explanatory power, Popper grants it no status beyond that of a merely unfalsified conjecture or guess. Clearly, this is not a matter of a lack of appropriate terminology, for the terms "verified", "confirmed", "tested" and "corroborated" are available and may be modified to express the strength deemed proper by the theorist.
Popper himself uses the term "corroborated" to describe "how far it [a theory, law, or hypothesis] has been able to prove its fitness to survive by standing up to tests." 20 Popper adds that "Some people thought that the phrase 'prove its fitness to survive' shows that I had here intended to speak of a fitness to survive in the future, to stand up to future tests. I am sorry if I have misled anybody, but . . . it was not I who mixed the Darwinian metaphor.
Nobody expects that a species which has survived in the past will therefore survive in the future •• . " 21 He adds that a statement of the corroboration or degree of corroboration of a theory is a "report of past performance" which says "nothing whatever about future performance, or about the 'reliability' of a theory. "22 This view is not only inconsistent with common ways of thinking but with some of Popper's own formulations.
Granting that we cannot conclude that a species which has survived up to some time t will therefore continue to survive after that time, it does not follow that we cannot reasonably expect that an athlete or a device which performs up to a certain level through a series of tests of increasing difficulty will perform at approximately that level given other tests of equal or even somewhat greater difficulty.
Such past performance is commonly taken to indicate the propensity or the disposition of the athlete or device to perform in typical ways under similar and perhaps even under more stringent conditions.
Popper himself talks of propensities and dispositions in the following: "Every experimental arrangement is liable to produce, if we repeat the experiment very often, a sequence with frequencies which depend upon this particular experimental arrangement. These virtual frequencies may be called probabilities.
They characterize the disposition, or the propensity, of the experimental arrangements to give rise to certain characteristic frequencies when the experiment is often repeated."23
Just as we are not restricted to saying that the experimental arrangement or athlete or device has merely performed in such a way in tests to date, but may attribute propensities to the arrangement, device or, athlete, so it would seem reasonable to characterize our best-tested theory as one we could reasonably expect not to be falsified under a range of test conditions either the same as or similar to those it had survived in previous testing. There are obvious differences between a law or a theory and an experimental arrangement, an athlete, or a device.
However, a law or theory may be viewed as an instrument for giVing true predictions or good explanations, etc., and a person may be so similarly viewed. If a person can be described as truthful or as a reliable predictor or a good explainer, it would seem to be legitimate to so describe a theory or a law. This is to suggest that a report on the corroboration of a law or theory could reasonably be taken as more than merely a report of past performance, i.e., say something, however cautiously, about the future.
There is no more guarantee that a law or theory which currently has been and is a good predictor or is "truthful" will continue to be so under new and more difficult conditions than that a person may retain these propensities under such conditions. If all one can say of the best-tested member of a set of competitors is that it has not yet been falsified, there is no reason to take this member as closer to the truth or as having a higher truth content than those already falsified.
Paradoxically, Popper states principles which require the competitors of a theory T to have greater explanatory power and empirical content than T--as if the rejection of T would then leave us with a competitor T* which is nearer to the whole truth than was T. For example, Popper requires "that the new theory, although it has to explain what the old theory explained, corrects the old theory, so that it actually contradicts the old theory: it contains the old theory, but only as an approximation." 24 Popper says that "Einstein's theory contradicts Newton's, which it .
• . explains, and contains as an approximation "25 and adds: "Some of us (for example Einstein himself) sometimes wish to say . . . that we have reason to conjecture that Einstein's theory of gravity is not true, but that it is a better approximation to truth than Newton's." 26 For this reason Popper introduced and attempted to explicate the notion of truth-likeness or verisimilitude which "measures not that kind of approximation to truth which may be achieved by saying nothing . . . , but the approach to 'the whole truth' through a greater and greater truth content. " 27 Popper states repeatedly that verisimilitude is "a more adequate aim of science .
• . than truth"28 because "we are not simply looking for truth, we are after interesting and enlightening truth, after theories which offer solutions to interesting problems. If at all possible, we are after deep theories. "29 What Popper wants and believes he can do is to "explain the method of science ••. as the rational procedure for getting near to the truth" . 30 Moreover, Popper contends that "while we can never have sufficiently good arguments in the empirical sciences for claiming that we have actually reached the truth, we can have strong and reasonably good arguments for claiming that we may have made progress towards the truth; that is, that the theory Ta is preferable to its predecessor T1, at least in the light of all known rational arguments. "31
We cannot construct a strong and reasonably good argument that T2 is preferable to T1 in the sense of being nearer to (or a better approximation of) the whole truth if our premises are confined to reports of the past performance of Ta and T1 on various tests and our rules of inference are those of deductive logic. At best, we will be able to say that Ta was not falsified by test Z whereas T1 was falsified by test Z.
Popper himself suggests that our critical discussion of theories is an adequate basis for preferring the best-tested theory as a basis for action. Raising the pragmatic problems of induction, i.e., the question (1) "Pr1 Upon which theory should we rely for practical action, from a rational point of view?" and (2) "Pra Which theory should we prefer for practical action, from a rational point of view?" , 32 Popper goes on to say initially that from "a rational point of view, we should not 'rely' on any theory, for no theory has . . • or can be shown to be true."33 However, he adds not only that "we should prefer as[a] basis for action the best-tested theory" but also that "it will be 'rational' to choose the best-tested theory .
• . in the most obvious sense of the word ['rational'] .
• . : the best-tested theory is the one which, in the light of our critical discussion, appears to be the best so far, and I do not know of anything more 'rational' than a well-conducted critical discussion. " 34 In sum, our critical discussion, the present state of which may be expressed in a report on the (degree of) corroboration of a theory pro-vides an adequate basis for the rational preference of, e.g., Tz to Tl for purposes of practical action.
Popper says that "in choosing the best-tested theory as a basis for action, we 'rely' on it in some sense of the word" and the best-tested theory may be described "as the most 'reliable' theory available, in some sense of this term. " 35 Popper adds that the best-tested theory is not utterly reliable "in the sense that we shall always do well, even in practical action, to foresee the possibility that something may go wrong with our expectations. "36 Even our best-tested theories may be falsified.
Popper does not draw the distinction between pragmatic or practical questions and theoretical problems with any great care.
A sharp theoretical/practical (pragmatic) distinction would be objectionable in the context of Popper's critical method, for Popper's critical method itself requires that we rely on some laws or theories while testing other laws or theories.
Popper's method of testing or attempted falsification requires that a theory of law be falsified not by a report of a stray or isolated observation. Rather, a theory or law is falsified only by a falsifying law or theory37 or a falsifying hypothesis. 38 That is, what is required to falsify a law or theory is a reliable report of regularly occurring phenomenon, a report that is in principle inter-subjectively testable. 39 For example, to show that gravity is not a constant as implied by Galileo's physics, what is required is a regularly observable variation in the force of gravity.
The conflict between a theory, and a falsifying law with a systematically obtainable observation report does not in and of itself deductively show that the theory or law under test is refuted. Suppose the theory or law under test implies that, under conditions C, phenomenon 0 occurs and the falsifying law implies that, under conditions C, phenomenon 0 does not occur, and 0 does not occur under conditions C. What we have is not a refutation or falsification of the law or theory under test but an inconsistency between the law or theory under test and the falsifying law or theory together with the observation report. What is required to turn this· inconsistency into a "refutation" or "falsification" is some reason to prefer the claim of the falsifying law and its associated observation report to the clail\} of the theory or law under test. That is, there is a theoretical need to 'rely' on some laws or theories in testing other laws or theories.
propose to take our best tested theories, hypotheses, and laws as rationally preferable to those which failed severe testing. This principle, like Popper's more restricted principle of pragmatic or practical rational preference, is not a principle of deductive logic. However, such a principle is necessary if a rational preference, with respect to truth and falsity, for some competing universal theories over others is to be justified by "empirical reasons". Popper requires, but fails to explicitly state, such a principle of rational preference in order to support his positive answer to his third reformulation (La) of Hume's logical problem of induction.
that, more ing.
Having extended Popper's view in this manner, it should be said even in this extended form, Popper's view is too limited for the general purpose of developing a theory of non-deductive reasonThere are at least two reasons for viewing Popper's approach as too limited. First, we are not always concerned to rationally prefer one universal explanatory theory or one law to other theories or laws. Some of our non-deductive reasoning concerns rational preferences between hypotheses about suspects in a criminal investigation or causes of an accident. Second, we do not always have available deductively adequate reasons for rational preference.
We may find ourselves with a set of competing mutually exclusive answers to or hypotheses about some questions of interest,--e.g., either A or B or C or D--and not be able to rule out any of these as clearly false.
We may in some cases only be able to say that, e.g., A, is less plausible than is D for some specified reasons.
Murder mysteries may be used to illustrate these two reasons. Detective Holmes may be unable to rule out as plausible suspects in the murder of Baron Gotrox any of the four persons Abercrombie, Cook, Butler, and Gardner who were isolated with the late Baron in his remote mountain top castle from a period of twenty-four hours before the estimated time of death of the late Baron until the arrival of Holmes and his colleagues. Nevertheless, Holmes may be able to rationally prefer Abercrombie to Cook, Gardener to Butler, etc., on various grounds.
Rescher views plausibility theory as providing an instrument for dealing with cognitive dissonance that arises when our sources of information provide us with conflicting data.
Plausibility theory seeks to provide a rational basis for "discriminating between the inferences which can and cannot be drawn from the inconsistent data-base yielded by the conflicting reports of imperfect sources. "40 Rescher contends that plausibility theory requires "resources transcending the austere apparatus of [deductive] logic and probability."4l Emphasizing the differences between plausibility and probability, Rescher points out that plausibility is a classificatory concept which ranks "propositions by the status of the evidential sources or validating principles that vouch for them." 42 Moreover, there are important functional differences between the notion of plausibility and that of probability because they have different calculi.
The basic notion in the plausibility calculus is that of a "p-set", i.e., "a set of plausible propositions, of propositions that have been vouched for by sources of some degree of positive reliability, however slight."u The plausibility calculus contains six conditions or axioms which describe the indexing of the propositions in a p-set S: (1) Every proposition P in S is assigned a plausibility value IPI = k, where O<k 1); (2) Logical truths are assigned maximum plausibility, i.e., for any logical truth, P, IPI = 1; (3) All I-indexed propositions must be logically compatible and also compatible with fundamental propositions of a factual nature; (4) If a set of mutually consistent propositions Pl • . . , Pj in S entails some other proposition Q in S, then the plausibility of Q,
i.e., IQ/, is greater than or equal to the plausibility of the least plausible of PI • . . , PJ; (5) Both P and -P (i.e., not P) may be relatively highly plausible or the reverse, excluding IPI = I-PI = 1; and (6) In a conflict between propositions of different plausibility, the more plausible must never give way to the less plausible.44
The calculus of probability does not contain a law of negation such as is found in the probability calculus. Therefore, if IPI is given, I-PI is not determined, in contrast to the corresponding case for the probability calculus. Condition (4) reflects another significant difference between the plausibility and probability calculi, viz., that in the case of plausibility, the conjunction of a set of premises may have a plausibility ranking equal to or greater than the least plausible of the premises. However, the probability of a compound proposition P &, Q is commonly taken as lower than the probability of either P or Q taken alone.
Rescher describes a number of different bases for plausibility ranking or indexing. The core idea here is that a proposition "is more or less plausible depending on the reliability of the sources that vouch for it. "45 The sources include: (i) personsj (ii) impersonal sources such as oral tradition, common knowledge, historical accounts, newspaper stories; (iii) an individual's sense perception and memory; (iv) intellectual or formal sources such as postulations, reasonable inference, conjecturej and (v) claim-authorizing principles such as simplicity or uniformity.
Rescher also describes plausibility rankings indicating epistemic firmness, e.g., in decreasing order of plausibility, propositions which are Perhaps the most interesting of these bases for our purposes is that of warranting or claim-authorizing principles.
Included among these principles are "the standard inductive desiderata: simplicity, uniformity, specificity, definiteness, determinative ness, 'naturalness', etc." In addition, "the probative strength of confirming evidence could serve as yet another basis of plausibility", i.e., "that of the rival theses whose supporting case of substantiating evidence is the strongest is thereby the most plausible." 47 Alongside this principle I would place the principle that a better tested theory or law which has survived severe testing is more plausible than a theory or law which has failed such testing.
Rescher insists that "an inductive inference can always be looked upon as an aspiring but failed deductive inference, an enthymeme, an argument in whose formulation some crucially necessary premise is lacking. "48 He proposes that inductive argumentation involves a characteristic two-step procedure in response to a question: (i) possibility elaboration and (ii) possibility reduction. Suppose the question prompting our inquiry is that facing Holmes upon being called to the Gotrox castle, viz., "Who killed Baron Gotrox?". Suppose a body of background knowledge B and some data D, whose plausibility is not questioned:
1. Baron Gotrox was murdered 2. No persons other than Abercrombie, Butler, etc. had an opportunity to kill the Baron during the appropriate time period.
The step of possibility elaboration is that of conjecturing additional premises leading, when used with Band D, deductively to one or another answer to the question "Who Killed Baron Gotrox?"
For example, we might conjecture:
3. Butler and only Butler had both motive and opportunity. Only persons having both motive and opportunity commit murders.
Premises 1, 2, and 3 deductively entail an answer to our question, viz., "Butler killed Baron Gotrox".
Of course, we might also conjecture: 3* Gardener is a homicidal maniac who kills regularly without motive because of a bio-chemical deficiency which has been until recently treated by Baron Gotrox using daily injections of a certain drug. The supply of the drug was exhausted twenty four hours before the time of the murder. Because of foul weather, it was not possible to obtain additional supplies of the drug.
Premises 1, 2, and 3* deductively entail an answer to our question, viz., "Gardener killed Baron Gotrox".
The second step or stage of Rescher's procedure is to use comparative plausibilities to prefer one set of conjectured premises to another, e.g., in our example, the set consisting of 3 to the set consisting of 3*.
The plausibility preference for such a set of premises carries with it the preference for the associated answer.
Rescher's procedure might better be liberalized so as not to require the deductive reconstruction.
The deductive reconstruction requires us to state the conjectured premise(s) in such a way as to ensure deductive validity. Thus, we cannot offer as a gap-filling premise the modest claim "Usually, only persons having both motive and opportunity commit murders" but must offer the much stronger claim contained in premise 3, viz., "Only persons having both motive and opportunity commit murders."
The strength required for deductive validity may be such as to force us to assign a rather low plausibility ranking to premise 3. The strength required for deductive validity may be such as to force us to assign a lower plausibility ranking to 3 than to the somewhat fanciful 3* in cases where we want to say that Butler's having both motive and opportunity makes Butler a far more plausible suspect than any of the others.
I propose we adopt the principle that, in cases of murder investigation, hypotheses concerning suspects with both motive and opportunity are to be plausibilistically preferred to hypotheses concerning suspects failing to have both motive and opportunity.
I propose we set aside Rescher's insistence upon deductive reconstruction and merely take the data statements 1 and 2 and the further statement "Butler and only Butler had both motive and opportunity to kill Baron Gotrox" as a sufficient basis to warrant the rational preference for the answer "Butler killed Baron Gotrox" over its competitors.
There are at least two sources of error in the plauslbilistic rational preference model described here. First, as we noted in connection with Lehrer's notion of competition, the judgment of relative plausi-bility depends upon the set of alternative answers or hypotheses or theories considered. Second it is always possible that the plausibility ranking and the criteria of plausibility themselves are in error or are improperly applied. 
